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Abstract
Encouraging rapid and widespread adoption of non-normative climate-friendly
behaviors represents a crucial challenge for practitioners and policymakers alike, and
a new frontier in the transition to a greener economy. Yet, several such behaviors
are unobservable and undertaken privately. We devise a novel approach that makes
household renewable energy use visible to peers through yard signs and window clings,
thus creating social rewards for early adopters and sending a signal within their
communities. We implement a field experiment comprising over 20,000 customers of a
renewable energy utility in the United Kingdom and find that a significant proportion
are intrinsically motivated to put their invisible climate-friendly behavior on display.
Indeed, participation and display are identical across treatments with and without a
financial incentive.
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1 Introduction
The transition toward a clean energy economy to stabilize the global climate incontro-
vertibly requires rapid and widespread adoption of climate-friendly behaviors and tech-
nologies. While ambitious top-down climate policies that deliver economic incentives
for behavioral change are necessary for a successful transition, leveraging individuals’
prosocial proclivities is key for supporting it, especially with the relatively slow pace
of top-down policy implementation.
Recent research suggests that there is more cooperation in the climate commons
than economists generally assume (Carattini et al., 2019). Local social norms tend
to drive (conditionally) cooperative behaviors in global social dilemmas, as notably
evidenced in local dilemmas (Ostrom, 1990). Hence, behavioral interventions may be
geared to capitalize on such norms and guide behaviors toward greener decisions. A
growing body of research uses behavioral interventions that rely on social compari-
son to promote energy conservation among households (see Schultz et al., 2007 and
Allcott, 2011 for two prominent studies). Following Cialdini (2003), these studies com-
bine descriptive norms that highlight the energy conservation e↵orts of neighbors, and
injunctive norms that remind households about the socially preferred level of energy
consumption. These social interventions have been successful in reducing households’
energy consumption by approximately 2-4% (Buckley, 2020).
However, a more di cult task—one the literature has only recently considered—
remains in transitioning behaviors from non-normative to normative. In the case of
low behavioral adoption, unless one resorts to deception (e.g., Lindman et al., 2013),
standard descriptive norms are unlikely to be e↵ective, if not detrimental. For instance,
informing households that a small minority of their neighbors have adopted renewable
energy plans or taken particular energy e ciency and conservation measures is unlikely
to motivate further adoption.
Nevertheless, increasing the uptake of as yet non-normative behaviors is crucial
to transition to an environmentally sustainable path. In this paper, we present and
test a novel approach to foster the di↵usion of climate-friendly behaviors with low
levels of adoption. Our approach builds on three self-evident or empirically evidenced
observations. First, many non-normative climate-friendly behaviors—such as carbon
o↵setting, switching to renewable or flexible energy plans, or abstaining from flying—
are “socially invisible”. Second, people are more likely to undertake prosocial behaviors
if they can be seen doing so by others and, therefore, reap social rewards (Bénabou
and Tirole, 2006; Yoeli et al., 2013; Sexton and Sexton, 2014). Third, the more visible
is a given behavior, the faster it tends to spread through social contagion (Bollinger
and Gillingham, 2012; Narayanan and Nair, 2013; Baranzini et al., 2017).
In a large-scale field experiment, we identify an otherwise invisible climate-friendly
behavior—the adoption of renewable energy tari↵s—and allow households to publicize
it using yard signs and window clings. To implement the experiment, we partnered
with a 100% renewable energy utility (“Utility” hereafter) in England and Wales and
randomly selected 3,320 regions (“postcode sectors”) containing 20,648 customers (of
the eligible 6,671 regions with 74,534 customers) to be assigned to control and treatment
arms. Using a fractional factorial design with region-level randomization, we assigned
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customers to five groups that varied along two dimensions: (i) eligibility to receive
materials whose display is incentivized or not, and (ii) the content of their invitation
to participate in our program.
The first dimension allowed some households to receive a material showcasing the
household’s adoption of a renewable energy tari↵. The material either contained a
financial incentive to display it, or contained no such incentive. This incentive took the
form of a £50 referral bonus per customer referred using the unique promotional code
on one’s displayed material. The second dimension varied the information provided in
the email invitation to participate in our program, where participation entails opting
in to the program via submission of a brief informed consent survey. In particular, we
tested whether participation in the program increased when the invitation highlighted
various features of the treatment, namely the opportunity to receive a yard sign or
window cling, and whether there was a financial incentive to display the material. Ten
months after sending the invitations and seven months after distributing the materials,
we surveyed participants through a debrief questionnaire to understand the motives
that led them to display the signs and clings, as well as to measure displaying behavior.
Our study led to three main findings. First, a significant proportion of individuals
were intrinsically motivated to display their pro-environmental behavior via the o↵ered
materials, regardless of the prospects for financial gains.1 Second, participants followed
through and displayed their materials, again irrespective of the financial incentive.
Around 80% of participants who received signs or clings and took our debrief survey
reported having subsequently displayed their materials. Third, a large majority of the
sample reported that the main reason for displaying was to encourage others to adopt,
demonstrating a drive to act as front runners and influence others to follow suit.
Our findings carry important policy implications. For instance, practitioners and
policymakers may tap into the intrinsic motivation of prosocial citizens to increase
awareness of the availability and appeal of socially desirable behaviors, which may in
turn lead to further adoption. Hence, practitioners and policymakers interested in
generating higher adoption of non-normative behaviors may consider more varied and
cost-e↵ective means of achieving large-scale behavioral shifts than purely economic
incentives, particularly if the channels for visibility require minimal material costs
(e.g., in the case of online sharing features). Furthermore, our initiative illustrates
that many early adopters strongly welcome the opportunity to make their behavior
visible. Thus, early adopters may be willing to play a key role in spreading prosocial
behavior, increasing the success of interventions even when the descriptive norm is still
low. Finally, our findings raise an important question for future research regarding
whether people are more likely to adopt a climate-friendly behavior when they know
that they may have the opportunity to earn social rewards from doing so.
These findings contribute to several strands of literature. First, they expand upon
a recent theoretical and empirical literature that studies innovative ways to transition
1Customers could be driven to display their material due to a prosocial and/or signaling motive. For instance,
if the motivation for displaying is to increase renewable energy adoption for environmental reasons, the individual is
prosocially motivated. If one displays for reputational (or internal moral consistency) reasons, then the individual
engages in social (self) signaling. Motivational crowding would thus only be applicable in the case of prosocial
motivation and/or perceived prosocial motivation by one’s peers. We explore these motivations in section 3.3.
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from as yet non-normative to normative behaviors (Jacobsen et al. 2013; Kraft-Todd
et al. 2015; Catalini and Tucker 2017; Sparkman and Walton 2017; Bicchieri and
Dimant 2019; Mortensen et al. 2019; Spencer et al. 2019; Andreoni et al. 2020; Carattini
and Blasch 2020; Carattini et al. 2021). Second, they contribute to a broader literature
that uses behavioral interventions to spur pro-environmental behavior (see Buckley
2020 for a review). Third, they expand the research that analyzes the adoption of
renewable energy tari↵s and its drivers (e.g. Clark et al. 2003; Kotchen and Moore
2007; Jacobsen et al. 2013). Finally, the above findings add to an established literature
that examines the role of social rewards—and indirect reciprocity, in particular—in
driving prosocial behavior (including pro-environmental choices) both in the lab and
in the field (Nowak and Sigmund 1998; Wedekind and Milinski 2000; Andreoni and
Petrie 2004; Rege and Telle 2004; Haley and Fessler 2005; Andreoni and Bernheim
2009; Ariely et al. 2009; Rand et al. 2009; Griskevicius et al. 2010; Yoeli et al. 2013).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our research
design and data. Section 3 provides our empirical results. Section 4 concludes and
draws implications for policy and future research.
2 Research Design
2.1 Sample
Our approach relies on identifying and leveraging the enthusiasm of early adopters to
improve the visibility of non-normative behaviors that may become more popular with
greater observability or increased awareness via social channels (see Wolske et al., 2020,
for a review). To this end, we partnered with a leading renewable energy supplier in
England and Wales to conduct a field experiment with their customers. Our partner’s
mission combined with energy prices and customer acquisition data indicate that these
customers are engaged in the energy market and have relatively strong environmental
preferences (see Gosnell, 2018 for further details).2
At the time of randomization, the entire eligible population of customers included
74,534 households. Eligibility criteria at the household level required that subjects
have an email address on file and either an electricity-only or dual-fuel (i.e. gas and
electricity) account; gas-only customers were ineligible to participate. The Utility
consented to randomly select 20,648 customers for participation in the experiment and
assign them to treatment arms, based on the power calculations provided in Table A.2.
Randomization occurred at the postcode sector level, such that all customers in the
same postcode sector were assigned to the same treatment, to prepare for potential fur-
ther studies using spatial data.3 Starting from 6,671 postcode sectors—i.e. all postcode
2Allcott (2015) highlights the risk of ‘site selection bias’ in making out-of-sample predictions. Our research
intentionally investigates a select sample of early adopters within an environmentally progressive utility, and we do
not intend for these results to generalize to later adopters. Early adopters are indeed the main focus of our research
and a key resource, we argue, for practitioners and policymakers to stimulate behavioral change. See Appendix C for
further discussion.
3A postcode sector is a relatively small geographical unit in the United Kingdom. It includes the outward code
(the part of the postcode before the space), and the first digit of the inward code, e.g. “SE13 7”. On average, there
are about 7,384 residents in a postcode sector, and there are over 11,000 postcode sectors in the United Kingdom.
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sectors with at least one eligible Utility customer as of February 2019, thus representing
the customer population of 74,534 households at the time of randomization—we ran-
domly selected 3,320 postcode sectors, equivalent to a sample size of 20,648 customers.
In February 2019, there were six customers on average in each eligible postcode sector.
Our recruitment approach involved contacting customers via emails with experi-
mentally varied content (as described in Section 2.2) to invite them to participate in
our research initiative. Of the 20,648 households emailed, 3,949 (19%) signed up to
participate. Among participants, fewer than 3% ultimately attrited from the study.
2.2 Experimental Design
Postcode sector-level assignment to receive materials—with or without financial incen-
tives to display them—constitutes the first level of randomization. Specifically, we first
assigned randomly selected postcode sectors to one of three conditions: a control con-
dition receiving no materials (Control), a first treatment condition receiving materials
with no incentive for their display (Display), or a second treatment condition receiv-
ing materials with incentives for their display in the form of a £50 referral bonus for
each new customer recruited using the promotional code on the participant’s display
material (Incentivized Display). That is, those in the Incentivized Display treatment
only received the referral bonus if their referral code was used, whereas those in the
Display treatment never received the referral bonus, even if their referral code was
used. With either treatment, the referee, i.e. any individual who switched to Utility
using a project-specific referral code, received the standard £50 referral bonus.
Individuals in Display and Incentivized Display received either a yard sign or a
window cling depending on whether they lived in a detached home, semi-detached
home, or ground-floor flat (sign assignment), or a terraced home or apartment building
(cling assignment).4 Signs and clings appear as in Figure 1.
The second level of randomization in the fractional factorial design varies the in-
formation provided—and, thus, motivations triggered—during the initial recruitment
of participants.5 Within each of the two treated groups, a randomly selected half
received a recruitment email that detailed the intervention to which they had been
assigned, while the other half received a recruitment email that provided no informa-
tion on the intervention (identical to the email sent to the Control group; see emails
4Upon consent provision, participants selected their dwelling type from a list of options, representative of housing
types in the United Kingdom (i.e. flat - ground floor, flat - not ground floor, terraced home, detached/semi-detached
home, cottage/bungalow, other). For those in flats that are not on the ground floor, we asked a follow-up question
regarding the floor of their flat (basement, 1, 2, 3, 3+). We accommodated a handful of individuals who emailed the
project email address to request the alternative display material.
5Note that, in compliance with the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), all
customers—even those in the Control group—received an invitation to participate in our program, though those
in the Control group were solely invited to participate in our study debrief survey and did not receive any informa-
tion about the materials sent to treated participants. Note also that a third source of exogenous variation assigned
a minority of postcode sectors to the possibility of a one-o↵ ‘monitoring session’ for measurement of compliance,
which simply included an additional line in the one-page information sheet linked in the consent survey notifying
the participants that we may receive their address data from the Utility, a process also required under GDPR. The
outcome of the monitoring exercise was generally in line with self-reported adoption, which we discuss in section 3.
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in Appendix F). Therefore, using a stratified randomization procedure,6 we randomly
allocated 3,320 eligible postcode sectors to be in one of the five groups in Table 1,
resulting in the allocation shown in Figure 2. We sent recruitment emails across four
waves (two recruitment emails per week over two weeks), with 166 postcode sectors
per group-wave.7
(a) Sign (A4 size, 8.27” x 11.69”)
(b) Window Cling (A5 size, 5.83” x 8.27”)
Figure 1: Treatment Materials
Table 1: Assignment of Postcode Sectors to Treatment
Consent Email
Control Display Incentivized Display
Control (n=664) 664 - -
Display (n=1,328) 664 664 -
Incentivized Display (n=1,328) 664 - 664
6In order to control for unobserved variability, our stratified randomization sorts all eligible postcode sectors into
blocks according to number of customers per 1,000 residents, share of the population classified as urban, and share
of energy accounts in the postcode sector linked to suppliers of varying levels of renewable energy in their fuel mix.
7We implemented the recruitment in four waves to ensure that we did not over-subscribe beyond our budget
constraints, as determined by the cost of producing and delivering yard signs and window clings. Our anticipated
participation level was fairly accurate, so that we were able to complete all four waves. All waves took place between
March 5-15, 2019, with reminder emails sent between March 12-22, 2019. We sent a final reminder on April 4, 2019.
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Figure 2: Randomized Assignment Map
The factorial design confers three main benefits. First, it allows us to determine
whether the opportunity to engage in social signaling using our materials a↵ects partic-
ipation and display behavior. The potential e↵ect of recruitment messaging on partic-
ipation is important from the perspective of practitioners and policymakers, who may
seek to implement similar programs in the future, as well as for academics, who may be
interested in subjects’ motivations to participate in such an initiative, particularly in
the absence of financial incentives. Relatedly, the design allows us to identify any dif-
ferential compliance e↵ect—where compliance entails displaying the materials—since
there may be selection e↵ects based on whether the treatment itself is salient at the
recruitment stage. Lastly, from an internal validity perspective, the design preserves
our ability to compare outcomes of subjects in the treated and control conditions con-
trolling for the possibility of selection based on recruitment messaging.8
The field experiment began in March 2019, when the randomized recruitment emails
that solicited informed consent to join the initiative were sent through Qualtrics to all
target households (see Appendix C for a comparison of eligible and ineligible postcode
sectors). In June 2019, treated households were notified that the display materials
were to be sent to their addresses shortly, while a small selection of treated addresses in
London were visited over the following weeks for a qualitative assessment of compliance.
Lastly, participants received a debrief survey via email in late January 2020, followed
by a reminder email in early March for those who had not yet responded. The survey
closed in June 2020.
8The drawback of all factorial designs is the potentially reduced precision with which we may be able to estimate
the treatment e↵ect of a particular combination of treatments, given that each combination inherits a smaller sample
size than it would in the absence of the additional randomly assigned factors. We took this drawback into account
when conducting our power calculations, so that the presented coe cients are generally precisely estimated.
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2.3 Randomization Procedure and Balance Tests
We produced ten stratified random assignments and selected the randomization that
minimized di↵erences across treatment and email assignments. We performed a num-
ber of balance tests to ensure that our randomization was successful (see Tables A.3
and A.4). These tests include data at the postcode sector level on the number of Utility
customers, urbanization, voting behavior, age, employment, generalized trust, environ-
mental attitudes, supplier type (in terms of contribution of renewable sources to the
supplier’s energy mix), and electricity meter type. We find no systematic di↵erences
across treatment groups—neither for assignment to receive materials (and incentives)
nor for assignment to the recruitment email variant—at the 5% significance level.
2.4 Debrief Survey
We administered a debrief survey to all 3,836 participants remaining in the study at the
beginning of 2020. It opened on January 30, with eligibility for ten lottery prizes each
worth £100 in Tango rewards, a popular e-gift card program in the United Kingdom,
that would close on March 20, 2020.
The aim of the survey is fourfold. First, it allows us to determine whether eligi-
ble participants actually received their display material and, conditional on receipt,
whether the participants went on to display them. If materials were displayed, we
elicited information on their specific location and visibility, as assessed by the par-
ticipants. For those who did not display their material, we asked their reasons for
abstaining. Second, we explore the motives of participants to demand and display a
yard sign or window cling. Third, we collect data about the neighborhood in which the
participants live and the extent of relationships among neighbors to allow for assess-
ment of generalizability, as social capital may matter for people’s willingness to engage
in publicly displaying their pro-environmental behavior (see Table A.5). Finally, we
collect participants’ standard socioeconomic characteristics as well as political prefer-
ences, environmental preferences, and reported environmental behaviors. Appendix G
provides the full survey instrument.
Table 2: Survey Participation by Email x Treatment Assignment
Email x Treatment No. %
Control 453 51.5
Control email/Display 374 46.6
Display email/Display 343 51.0
Control email/Incentivized Display 370 45.6
Display email/Incentivized Display 324 47.4
Total 1864 -
The overall response rate was 48.6%. Table 2 provides the response rate by treat-
ment arm. Using a chi-square goodness-of-fit test to determine whether the expected
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and observed response frequencies vary—where the expected frequency is the num-
ber of responses we would expect based on the number of survey links sent to each
email-by-treatment group—we do not find evidence of imbalance in survey response
frequency across groups ( 2=4.73, p=0.316).9
3 Empirical Results
Our main outcomes of interest are participation in the initiative (submitting an in-
formed consent survey) and displaying of materials conditional on having received
them, the latter of which is based on a self-reported measure from the debrief survey
emailed to participants six months after we distributed the materials.
3.1 Participation
We first test whether financial incentives serve to increase participation levels. A statis-
tical comparison of participation rates between the Display email (17.1% participation)
and the Incentivized Display email (16.8% participation) shows that, on average, fi-
nancial incentives did not motivate participation beyond the intrinsic motivation to
display.10 This result is confirmed by the regression estimates in Table 3. The e↵ect
of these two recruitment emails on participation is statistically indistinguishable and
virtually identical.
While we could immediately conclude that financial incentives did not (de-)motivate
participation, we also test for heterogeneity across several dimensions to determine
whether the lack of di↵erence in participation conditional on these o↵ers is due to
systematic variation in responses across subjects. In principle, it could be the case
that financial incentives increase adoption in one customer “type” while decreasing
it in another by the same amount–for instance, due to motivational crowding out–so
that the two e↵ects exactly o↵set each other; Appendix D tackles this question. We
find no evidence of any statistically significant heterogeneous treatment e↵ects and no
pattern su ciently strong to justify equally compensated crowding in and crowding
out. Our result is consistent with the general observation that motivational crowding
out is relatively rare in the field (DellaVigna and Pope, 2018).
We additionally test whether the opportunity to display one’s adoption of a renew-
able energy plan encouraged participation beyond the option to respond to a research
survey alone, the latter representing our control group. Contrary to our intuition, the
o↵er of free materials actually decreased participation from 20.6% for individuals who
received a recruitment email without an o↵er to receive materials, to 16.9% for those
who received an o↵er of free materials (t-test, p=0.00). We explore these results further
in Section 3.3 below.
9Aggregating this balance test to consider treatment—as opposed to email-by-treatment—assignment, the same
test produces  2=3.01, p=0.222.
10Note that we do not have information on how many customers opened our invitation email. These figures
therefore represent the relevant number for replication purposes, by practitioners or policymakers, but possibly are a
lower-bound measure of actual interest in participation conditional on opening one’s energy supplier’s emails.
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Table 3: E↵ect of Receiving the
Incentivized Display Email Relative to
the Display Email





Notes: The dependent variable in this regression is a
dummy variable for having signed up to participate in
the initiative (=1) or not (=0), and we report the re-
gression using standard OLS, though the results are ro-
bust to use of a logit regression. The reference category
is the group who received the Display email (i.e. with
no financial incentive).
3.2 Displaying Behavior
Further, we examine whether participating customers who were eligible to receive
materials—regardless of which recruitment email they received—subsequently dis-
played the yard signs and window clings they received, and whether we observe any
di↵erence across treatments in the propensity to display. If such “compliance” were
low, then we would conclude that, upon receipt of the material, participants (implic-
itly) assessed that the combined prosocial and signaling motives do not outweigh the
e↵ort costs, or that the signs and window clings fell short of their expectations. On
the contrary, the debrief survey data show that the self-reported display rate is 78.5%
conditional on having received the materials, as 87% of the treated survey sample did.
We further explore motives for displaying below.
In line with the absence of an e↵ect of the financial incentive on participation, we
do not find a statistically significant di↵erence in self-reported displaying behavior be-
tween the first (77.4%) and second (79.5%) treatment arms ( 2-test, p=0.38). We thus
conclude that a sizable proportion of sampled individuals were intrinsically motivated
to sign up to receive materials as well as to display them, and that financial incentives
did not significantly alter these behaviors.
It is important to note that the display rate is calculated over the participants who
responded to the survey and cannot be observed for those who did not. Responding
to the survey and displaying the material could be correlated. An extreme assumption
would be that all participants who did not respond to the survey did not display the
material. In this case, we would obtain a lower bound for the display rate of 37.4%,
resulting from the weighted average of 0% presumed display behavior among the 52.5%
of the treated sample who did not participate in the survey, and the reported 78.5%
display rate among the remaining 47.5% respondents who did.
While overall displaying behavior would be fairly high even in this rather extreme
scenario, we test the plausibility of the assumption that non-respondents did not display
their material by comparing display rates among respondents based on the week of
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response. The assumption here is that individuals who replied to the survey later,
including after an email reminder, would be more similar to individuals who did not
respond at all than those who responded right away. Figures 3 and 4 show that
while most responses were recorded within a few days from the initial invitation or
from a reminder, the compliance rate was rather stable over time. If anything, it
increased over time, suggesting that the eagerness with which participants completed
the survey does not positively correlate with self-reported compliance. This pattern
partially addresses our concern about selection and social desirability bias, and again
supports the evidence regarding prosocial and signaling motivations’ e↵ectiveness to
make invisible environmental behaviors observable to peers.
3.3 Mechanisms
In this section, we provide a set of exploratory analyses to delve deeper into the factors
underlying our main results. We first analyze the motives for people’s decisions to
display materials. Then, we investigate the di↵erence in participation between the
control and treatment groups.
In line with the main goal of our initiative, Table 4 shows that the primary reported
motive for displaying was overwhelmingly to encourage others to adopt. Among re-
spondents who did not display, about 55% declared that their decision was due to lack
of visibility to passersby. A small minority did not like the material’s aesthetics (7.6%),
while another small minority lost their material to pests or thieves (8.0%). Thus, peo-
ple appreciated the opportunity to influence others’ behaviors, giving prominence to
their role as front runners. Besides direct social signaling, which is identified as a main
motive by some participants, social rewards are also at stake, since the intervention
provides treated subjects with the opportunity to act as role models or “influencers”
to encourage others to undertake prosocial decisions.
Table 4: Reported Motives for Displaying
Motive Responses Percent
Encourage others to adopt 710 86.0%
Reciprocity to supplier 48 5.8%
Social signaling 41 5.0%
Financial incentive 7 1.1%
Other 18 2.2%
Notes: The relevant survey question asked, “What did you primar-
ily hope to achieve by displaying the sign/window cling?” The pro-
vided responses, in randomized order, included, “Displaying may
encourage others to adopt renewable energy as well, which would
have environmental benefits” (Encourage others to adopt); “I love
Good Energy, and this is the least I can do to support them the
same way they’ve supported me” (Reciprocity to supplier); “I want
others to know that my dwelling is powered by 100% renewable en-
ergy” (Social signaling); and “I was interested in the financial in-
centives associated with the initiative.”
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Figure 3: Debrief Survey Responses Over Time
Figure 4: Display Rates and Response Time
Next, we analyze the di↵erence in participation (i.e. consent provision) based on
whether the recruitment email made an explicit o↵er to send display materials. As
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indicated in section 3, we find that participation was lower for those who received an
explicit o↵er to receive a display material (16.9%) than for those who did not (20.6%).
To explain the lower participation conditional on receiving such an o↵er, we leverage
the five-arm structure of the research design.11 Our main conjecture for the di↵er-
ence between control and treatment arms is that a small minority of utility customers
have very strong environmental preferences, such that while they would take part in
a research initiative collecting data about their behavior in terms of renewable energy
use, they would not consent to a similar initiative involving provision of disposable
materials.
Three issues lend support to this conjecture. First, customers who received the
control email who were nevertheless assigned to receive a material may have been
more likely to attrit once they were notified that they would be receiving the material.
Second, these customers may have been less likely to display the materials they received,
given they had not explicitly opted in to receive them. Third, our sample of green
utility customers is characterized by rather strong environmental preferences, both in
absolute terms and relative to the underlying population (see Tables 5 and A.6).
We can empirically explore the second and third issues. With regard to the first,
attrition is measured as the fraction of participants that, after receiving a notification
that their sign or cling would be sent shortly, contacted us to let us know that they
were not interested in receiving it. Attrition was rather low, with only about 3%
of participants dropping out. While this level of attrition may partially explain the
di↵erence in participation conditional on email received—i.e. if most or all attritors
received the control email and were assigned to receive materials—we unfortunately
do not have access to di↵erential attrition rates across treatment arms due to data
protection regulations.
The second issue can be directly tested. We compare compliance rates across treat-
ment arms and find slightly lower compliance among the individuals who received the
control email than those who received either treatment email. While the di↵erence
is not statistically significant, it is on the same order of magnitude—about 2.5%—of
the di↵erence in participation between the treatment and control email arms. That is,
some customers receiving the control email might have otherwise opted out had they
been assigned to receive a treatment email.
The third reason relates to aversion to waste generation. While we intentionally
sought out an environmentally-friendly solution for the signs—an FSC-certified re-
cycled and recyclable outdoor board—window clings are inherently not recyclable,
and it would have been fair to assume that our initiative had a strictly positive foot-
print. We therefore use self-reported data on participants’ performance on three waste-
minimizing behaviors from the debrief survey as a measure of waste aversion. The
relevant question—drawn from the United Kingdom’s Understanding Society panel
survey (Wave 4, 2012-2014)—asked how often the participants (i) “decide not to buy
11All customers who received the control email and signed up would have done so through a consent survey where
they were asked to agree to take part in the study. One of the consent items declared that they had read the study
information sheet, which indicated that they may receive such materials. Thus, while this information was available
to them, it was not included in the invitation email and therefore lacked salience. All consenting households were
subsequently informed that materials were going to be mailed to them and were given another chance to opt out.
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something because they feel it has too much packaging”, (ii) “buy recycled paper
products such as toilet paper or tissues”, and (iii) “take their own shopping bag when
shopping”.12 In line with expectations, we find a relatively high level of waste aver-
sion among our participants, consistently across treatments, largely above what was
reported in the national survey from which we drew the question (Table 5). Hence,
our sample of early adopters of renewable energy is also a sample of “green warriors”
when it comes to waste aversion, which further supports the notion that the printing
of materials serves to reduce participation.13
Table 5: Comparison of Waste Behaviors between our Sample and the Underlying
Population
Variable UK Sample Debrief Survey Sample
Minimize Packaging % selected % selected
Never 53.18% 2.27%
Not very often 21.86% 18.04%
Quite often 8.86% 37.60%
Very often 4.05% 36.20%
Always 1.67% 5.06%
N/A 10.38% 0.83%
average score (scaled 1-5) 1.7 3.2
Buy Recycled Paper Products % selected % selected
Never 29.26% 0.93%
Not very often 21.76% 7.97%
Quite often 17.63% 14.61%
Very often 11.57% 30.91%
Always 7.75% 45.23%
N/A 12.03% 0.35%
average score (scaled 1-5) 2.4 4.1
Bring Reusable Shopping Bags % selected % selected
Never 15.92% 0.12%
Not very often 9.04% 0.23%
Quite often 10.78% 1.22%
Very often 14.46% 12.28%
Always 38.70% 86.03%
N/A 11.10% 0.12%
average score (scaled 1-5) 3.6 4.8
4 Conclusion
Tackling climate change requires radical societal changes, including rapid and
widespread adoption of climate-friendly technologies and behaviors that are often un-
familiar or seemingly out of reach for the majority of the population. A vast body of
12Note that each of these questions were asked on a five-point scale from “Never” to “Always”. However, due
to the very low number of observations in the lower categories, we combined the lowest two categories for both the
packaging and recycled products question, and converted the shopping bag variable to binary (i.e. either always or
otherwise) prior to running our regressions.
13The term “green warriors” was coined by the Utility to refer to many households in their customer base.
14
behavioral science research provides lessons on how to nudge individuals toward more
climate-friendly behaviors, mostly with social interventions that leverage descriptive
and injunctive norms.
Many such interventions have built on relatively large fractions of ‘virtuous’ house-
holds, which provide accordingly high descriptive norms. However, research has only
recently started to tackle the more di cult question of how to facilitate the transition
from non-normative to normative of various (and potentially more impactful) climate-
friendly behaviors. This experimental research focuses on how to popularize niche
behaviors for which the fraction of ‘virtuous’ households is still small and the use of
standard descriptive norms would likely backfire. Achieving behavioral change in such
settings could have sizable positive impacts, substantially reducing the environmen-
tal footprint of energy consumption well beyond what is generally achieved by social
interventions aimed at energy conservation.
One immediate observation when considering non-normative climate-friendly be-
haviors, such as carbon o↵setting or the adoption of renewable energy tari↵s, is that
they are largely unobservable. Hence, making such behaviors observable may accel-
erate their adoption. It is, however, an empirical question whether front runners are
willing to make their behavior visible when given the opportunity.
Our study addresses precisely this question in the context of 100% renewable energy
tari↵s. In particular, it examines whether early adopters are motivated to display
their climate-friendly behavior. To this end, we partnered with a renewable energy
utility in the United Kingdom to implement a field experiment comprising over 20,000
customers. Randomizing over geographical locales, we invited customers to participate
in an initiative that would provide them with free yard signs and window clings to
make their renewable energy choice visible.
Randomly varying the presence and salience of financial incentives to receive and
display these materials, we find that customers are indeed motivated to showcase their
pro-climate behavior, and that financial incentives are not necessary—nor e↵ective—
to encourage them. Hence, we provide strong evidence that a significant proportion
of early adopters of invisible climate-friendly behaviors (about 20%, in our context)
appreciates and capitalizes on the opportunity to make such behaviors observable.
This study paves the way for both new research and practitioner interventions to
generate novel solutions aimed at catalyzing early adoption of as yet non-normative
climate-friendly behaviors. Many such behaviors—not only carbon o↵setting and the
adoption of renewable energy tari↵s, but also for instance substituting air travel or in-
vesting in energy e ciency—have the potential to achieve sizable reductions in green-
house gas emissions, but their social invisibility may represent a challenge. Performing
them will not generate social rewards and the opportunities for social contagion may
be limited.
Our research highlights a vast opportunity to scale up niche behaviors by lever-
aging early adopters’ social motivations to improve the visibility of non-normative
choices. Future research should build on early adopters’ intrinsic motivation to dis-
play their climate-friendly behavior to increase the uptake of other prosocial behaviors
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There are two overarching outcomes of interest in this study: participation in the
program and compliance with the treatment (i.e. displaying of materials), as shown in
Table A.1.
Table A.1: Outcomes and Samples of Interest
Outcome: Unit Qualifier Size
Participation Household Received email Up to about 20,000
Display Household Opted in Approx. 2000
For participation, there were two possible scenarios at the outset: (1) relatively high
opt-in rates (e.g., 10-30%) or (2) relatively low opt-in rates (e.g. <10%). For the former
case, we performed power calculations based on di↵erences in proportions of households
that would opt in, and for the latter case we performed power calculations based on
di↵erences in rates. Given sample size uncertainty for participation, we investigated a
range of e↵ect sizes that would be detected with a sample size between 2000 and 4000
households. Next, we explored e↵ect sizes with a sample size of approximately 400
households for compliance.
All power calculations in Table A.2 centered upon a significance level of 95%
(↵=0.05) and power of 90% ( =0.10). Depending on the participation rate and our
assumptions about the proportion of households who would consent to participate with
the ‘control’ email, we expected to be powered to detect a 0.9 percentage point e↵ect
at best, and a 5.1 percentage point e↵ect at worst for participation. For compliance,
we expected to be powered to detect a 2.7 percentage point increase (from a baseline
of 0) in displaying of materials of Display over Control, and a 4 to 11.4 percentage
point increase in displaying of materials by Incentivized Display over Display. Finally,
depending again on the participation rate, we expected to be powered to detect a
treatment e↵ect of 2.7 to 8.5 percentage points in postcode sector level adoption rates
between treated and control groups.14
14Note that prior to the experiment, 0.1 residents per postcode sector were signing up to our partner utility each
quarter. Given that there were approximately 7,384 residents per postcode sector, we translated these figures into
a proportion to determine the lowest expected take-up rate in each postcode sector, i.e. 0.016 households per 1000
residents.
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Table A.2: Power calculations under various baseline assumptions
Outcome Power Test Power Alpha F MDE Lowest baseline Sample
Participation Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 2.4 0.09 3721 per group
Participation Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 3.3 0.09 2055 per group
Participation Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 2.2 0.08 3951 per group
Participation Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 3.1 0.08 2088 per group
Participation Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 2.1 0.07 3836 per group
Participation Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 2.9 0.07 2111 per group
Participation Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 2 0.06 3678 per group
Participation Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 2.7 0.06 2119 per group
Participation Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 1.8 0.05 3827 per group
Participation Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 2.5 0.05 2101 per group
Participation Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 1.6 0.04 3940 per group
Participation Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 2.3 0.04 2046 per group
Participation Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 1.4 0.03 3967 per group
Participation Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 2 0.03 2101 per group
Participation Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 1.2 0.02 3794 per group
Participation Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 1.7 0.02 2072 per group
Participation Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 0.9 0.01 3762 per group
Participation Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 1.3 0.01 2052 per group
Participation Two Props 90 0.05 10.51 0.023 0.1 3931 per group
Participation Two Props 90 0.05 10.51 0.032 0.1 2100 per group
Participation Two Props 90 0.05 10.51 0.03 0.2 3936 per group
Participation Two Props 90 0.05 10.51 0.042 0.2 2046 per group
Participation Two Props 90 0.05 10.51 0.033 0.25 3767 per group
Participation Two Props 90 0.05 10.51 0.045 0.25 2053 per group
Participation Two Props 90 0.05 10.51 0.034 0.3 3931 per group
Participation Two Props 90 0.05 10.51 0.047 0.3 2077 per group
Participation Two Props 90 0.05 10.51 0.036 0.4 3940 per group
Participation Two Props 90 0.05 10.51 0.05 0.4 2049 per group
Participation Two Props 90 0.05 10.51 0.037 0.5 3828 per group
Participation Two Props 90 0.05 10.51 0.051 0.5 2010 per group
C vs D Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 2.7 0 389 per group
D vs ID Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 4 0.01 394 per group
D vs ID Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 4.9 0.02 389 per group
D vs ID Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 5.5 0.03 399 per group
D vs ID Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 6.1 0.04 398 per group
D vs ID Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 6.7 0.05 391 per group
D vs ID Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 7.1 0.06 398 per group
D vs ID Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 7.6 0.07 393 per group
D vs ID Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 8 0.08 394 per group
D vs ID Two Rates 90 0.05 10.51 8.4 0.09 393 per group
D vs ID Two Props 90 0.05 10.51 0.079 0.1 399 per group
D vs ID Two Props 90 0.05 10.51 0.099 0.2 397 per group
D vs ID Two Props 90 0.05 10.51 0.105 0.25 397 per group
D vs ID Two Props 90 0.05 10.51 0.109 0.3 400 per group
D vs ID Two Props 90 0.05 10.51 0.114 0.4 397 per group
D vs ID Two Props 90 0.05 10.51 0.114 0.5 394 per group
Notes: We used a two-rates or two-proportions sample size calculation depending on the assumed baseline adoption in the
Control group. Observation units are households. ‘MDE’ stands for minimum detectable e↵ect.
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B Balance Tests
Table A.3: Balance Test of Treatment Assignment
Control T1 T2 T1= T2 T1= C T2= C
Customers 6.221 6.181 6.256 p= 0.810 p= 0.915 p= 0.926
(7.803) (8.005) (7.98)
Customers per 1K residents 1.033 1.056 1.04 p= 0.737 p= 0.694 p= 0.909
(1.189) (1.344) (1.218)
Urban Customers (%) 66.272 65.656 65.708 p= 0.976 p= 0.767 p= 0.785
(43.463) (44.084) (43.841)
Number of Residents 7312.131 7349.57 7338.337 p= 0.937 p= 0.829 p= 0.878
(3583.241) (3738.445) (3575.811)
Urban Population (%) 72.152 71.91 71.491 p= 0.799 p= 0.904 p= 0.741
(42.012) (42.284) (42.285)
Urban Area (%) 46.629 46.245 45.274 p= 0.531 p= 0.840 p= 0.475
(39.907) (40.062) (39.782)
Green Party Votes (%) 1.95 1.839 1.901 p= 0.525 p= 0.364 p= 0.709
(2.766) (2.198) (2.826)
Labour Party Votes (%) 40.837 40.636 40.12 p= 0.448 p= 0.814 p= 0.401
(18.178) (17.578) (17.562)
Density (residents/hectare) 26.855 28.513 27.648 p= 0.544 p= 0.318 p= 0.627
(33.478) (37.573) (35.907)
Mean Age 40.302 40.272 40.257 p= 0.933 p= 0.891 p= 0.837
(4.633) (4.616) (4.545)
Semi-/Detached Housing (%) 55.48 55.422 55.259 p= 0.868 p= 0.961 p= 0.853
(24.831) (25.094) (25.083)
Home Ownership (%) 64.547 64.467 64.36 p= 0.874 p= 0.922 p= 0.820
(17.383) (17.393) (17.28)
No Educational Qualifications (%) 21.512 21.146 21.363 p= 0.452 p= 0.313 p= 0.680
(7.696) (7.484) (7.417)
Unemployed (%) 4.006 3.94 3.971 p= 0.677 p= 0.463 p= 0.695
(1.888) (1.904) (1.903)
High Trust Score (%) 72.016 72.055 71.912 p= 0.431 p= 0.858 p= 0.640
(4.661) (4.714) (4.667)
Willing to Switch to Green Appliance (%) 86.492 86.468 86.498 p= 0.833 p= 0.892 p= 0.973
(3.652) (3.601) (3.561)
Willing to Reduce Energy Use (%) 74.954 74.725 74.713 p= 0.961 p= 0.425 p= 0.399
(6.049) (6.079) (5.914)
Favor Green energy (%) 73.513 73.345 73.402 p= 0.567 p= 0.172 p= 0.361
(2.575) (2.59) (2.505)
Feel Responsible for Climate (%) 79.529 79.498 79.517 p= 0.878 p= 0.842 p= 0.940
(3.311) (3.234) (3.265)
Favor Green Subsidies (%) 69.317 69.35 69.301 p= 0.819 p= 0.901 p= 0.952
(5.671) (5.673) (5.557)
Favor Fossil Fuel Tax (%) 38.471 38.506 38.395 p= 0.731 p= 0.93 p= 0.848
(8.356) (8.254) (8.336)
Supplier Renewable Share (<10%) 7.646 7.539 7.695 p= 0.084 p= 0.331 p= 0.663
(2.342) (2.249) (2.388)
Supplier Renewable Share (10%-25%) 52.208 52.403 52.179 p= 0.438 p= 0.574 p= 0.932
(7.165) (7.562) (7.342)
Supplier Renewable Share (25%-40%) 2.719 2.721 2.722 p= 0.990 p= 0.989 p= 0.981
(2.303) (2.405) (2.318)
Supplier Renewable Share (40%-80%) 23.381 23.315 23.41 p= 0.667 p= 0.805 p= 0.916
(5.629) (5.793) (5.565)
Supplier Renewable Share (80%-99%) 0.092 0.092 0.109 p= 0.096 p= 0.964 p= 0.114
(0.111) (0.121) (0.348)
Supplier Renewable Share (100%) 10.771 10.762 10.735 p= 0.832 p= 0.952 p= 0.811
(3.108) (3.264) (3.321)
Supplier Renewable Share (Unknown) 3.181 3.169 3.151 p= 0.700 p= 0.822 p= 0.595
(1.218) (1.179) (1.196)
SMETS1 Meter Installed (%) 35.518 35.107 35.393 p= 0.796 p= 0.651 p= 0.889
(19.75) (20.431) (19.939)
SMETS 2 Meter Installed (%) 0.235 0.22 0.249 p= 0.102 p= 0.288 p= 0.354
(0.325) (0.3) (0.324)
NSS Meter Installed (%) 7.016 7.036 6.948 p= 0.765 p= 0.935 p= 0.775
(5.634) (5.618) (5.187)
Prepay Meter Installed (%) 17.379 17.771 17.276 p= 0.365 p= 0.387 p= 0.813
(9.966) (10.161) (9.764)
Other Meter Installed (%) 39.852 39.865 40.135 p= 0.822 p= 0.989 p= 0.77
(21.202) (22.126) (21.714)
Customers N= 4,131 N= 8,209 N= 8,308
Postcode sectors n= 664 n= 1,328 n= 1,328
Notes: For a description of the balancing covariates, see Table A.8
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Table A.4: Balance Test of Email Assignment
Control T1 T2 T1=T2 T1=C T2=C
Customers 6.221 6.255 6.14 p= 0.79 p= 0.941 p= 0.844
(7.803) (8.419) (7.196)
Customers per 1K residents 1.033 1.053 1.042 p= 0.866 p= 0.772 p= 0.897
(1.189) (1.359) (1.197)
Urban Customers (%) 66.272 65.894 65.869 p= 0.992 p= 0.875 p= 0.866
(43.463) (44.056) (43.834)
Number of Residents 7312.131 7353.611 7361.955 p= 0.967 p= 0.836 p= 0.803
(3583.241) (3732.542) (3678.73)
Urban Population (%) 72.152 71.797 71.607 p= 0.935 p= 0.878 p= 0.814
(42.012) (42.361) (42.249)
Urban Area (%) 46.629 46.558 45.503 p= 0.633 p= 0.974 p= 0.608
(39.907) (40.354) (40.024)
Green Party Votes (%) 1.95 1.837 1.856 p= 0.89 p= 0.443 p= 0.501
(2.766) (2.632) (2.356)
Labour Party Votes (%) 40.837 40.735 40.476 p= 0.791 p= 0.917 p= 0.716
(18.178) (17.477) (18.007)
Density (residents/hectare) 26.855 28.709 28.404 p= 0.881 p= 0.336 p= 0.428
(33.478) (36.634) (37.541)
Mean Age 40.302 40.243 40.061 p= 0.473 p= 0.816 p= 0.336
(4.633) (4.719) (4.527)
(Semi-)/Detached Housing (%) 55.48 55.339 54.401 p= 0.500 p= 0.919 p= 0.433
(24.831) (25.41) (25.285)
Home Ownership (%) 64.547 64.616 63.833 p= 0.422 p= 0.943 p= 0.457
(17.383) (17.928) (17.599)
No Educational Qualifications (%) 21.512 20.884 21.349 p= 0.257 p= 0.131 p= 0.694
(7.696) (7.476) (7.471)
Unemployed (%) 4.006 3.938 4.034 p= 0.367 p= 0.514 p= 0.789
(1.888) (1.926) (1.983)
High Trust Score (%) 72.016 72.052 72.015 p= 0.887 p= 0.889 p= 0.997
(4.661) (4.745) (4.725)
Willing to Switch to Freen Appliance (%) 86.492 86.45 86.323 p= 0.524 p= 0.832 p= 0.402
(3.652) (3.568) (3.684)
Willing to Reduce Energy Use (%) 74.954 74.794 74.517 p= 0.400 p= 0.63 p= 0.183
(6.049) (6.088) (5.905)
Favor Green Energy (%) 73.513 73.335 73.347 p= 0.929 p= 0.214 p= 0.234
(2.575) (2.642) (2.487)
Feel Responsible for Climate (%) 79.529 79.508 79.43 p= 0.662 p= 0.908 p= 0.587
(3.311) (3.21) (3.332)
Favor Green Subsidies (%) 69.317 69.426 69.099 p= 0.299 p= 0.724 p= 0.491
(5.671) (5.618) (5.848)
Favor Fossil Fuel Tax (%) 38.471 38.458 38.219 p= 0.602 p= 0.977 p= 0.585
(8.356) (8.254) (8.403)
Supplier Renewable Share (<10%) 7.646 7.62 7.671 p= 0.688 p= 0.835 p= 0.848
(2.342) (2.297) (2.343)
Supplier Renewable Share (10%-25%) 7.646 7.62 7.671 52.208 52.427 52.248
p= 0.661 p= 0.585 p= 0.922
(7.165) (7.423) (7.457)
Supplier Renewable Share (25%-40%) 2.719 2.671 2.752 p= 0.527 p= 0.706 p= 0.795
(2.303) (2.355) (2.33)
Supplier Renewable Share (40%-80%) 23.381 23.171 23.42 p= 0.429 p= 0.502 p= 0.902
(5.629) (5.805) (5.657)
Supplier Renewable Share (80%-99%) 0.092 0.096 0.107 p= 0.249 p= 0.595 p= 0.119
(0.111) (0.127) (0.214)
Supplier Renewable Share (100%) 10.771 10.83 10.695 p= 0.463 p= 0.736 p= 0.671
(3.108) (3.31) (3.433)
Supplier Renewable Share (Unknown) 3.181 3.186 3.108 p= 0.243 p= 0.941 p= 0.268
(1.218) (1.25) (1.193)
SMETS1 Meter Installed (%) 35.472 36.547 34.535 p= 0.062 p= 0.325 p= 0.387
(19.978) (19.771) (19.476)
SMETS2 Meter Installed (%) 0.233 0.221 0.251 p= 0.104 p= 0.463 p= 0.357
(0.316) (0.297) (0.359)
NSS Meter Installed (%) 7.032 7.071 6.943 p= 0.681 p= 0.897 p= 0.774
(5.496) (5.517) (5.889)
Prepay Meter Installed (%) 17.421 17.217 17.501 p= 0.606 p= 0.71 p= 0.883
(9.867) (10.082) (9.962)
Other Meter Installed (%) 39.842 38.944 40.771 p= 0.116 p= 0.443 p= 0.423
(21.292) (21.331) (20.975)
Customers N= 4,131 N= 4,153 N= 4,077
Postcode sectors n= 664 n= 664 n= 664
Notes: For a description of the balancing covariates, see Table A.8
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C Comparison of Our Sample with the Under-
lying Population
For our experiment, we selected postcode sectors based on the presence of customers
of the Utility. Given that such customers are willing to pay a premium to receive
100% renewable energy from the Utility, we do not necessarily expect them to be
representative of the underlying population. Hence, Table A.5 shows the di↵erences in
self-reported social capital measures between our sample and the UK population, and
Table A.6 compares ‘eligible’ and ‘ineligible’ postcode sectors based on our criteria for
eligibility, i.e. that postcode sectors would need at least one Utility customer to be
selected for the experiment and for random allocation to one of the treatment arms.
As expected, eligible postcode sectors tend to di↵er from ineligible postcode sectors
on a variety of dimensions. Such di↵erences are virtually always statistically signifi-
cant, but only so often economically meaningful. Important di↵erences are observed
in, for instance, population, share of urban areas, voting behavior, and unemployment
rates. Even economically meaningful di↵erences between eligible postcode sectors and
ineligible ones, or the underlying population as a whole, would not a↵ect the exter-
nal validity of our results, since our subject pool is intentionally comprised of early
adopters of environmental behaviors. Table A.6, however, may help in identifying the
characteristics of the areas where such front runners live and may also help in devising
strategies to then expand to other populations.
Table A.5: Reported Social Capital Measures in the Debrief Survey and in the UK
Question Response Debrief survey UK sample
How strongly do you





How often do you
chat to your neighbours,




Thinking about the people
who live in this neighbourhood,
to what extent do you believe
they can be trusted?
Many people can be trusted
Some people can be trusted
A few people can be trusted










Table A.6: Di↵erences Between Ineligible and Eligible
Postcode Sectors
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Ineligible Eligible Di↵erence
Customers 0.000 6.359 6.359***
(0.000) (8.371) (0.227)
Customers Per 1K Residents 0.000 1.059 1.059***
(0.000) (1.607) (0.044)
Urban Customers (%) 0.000 65.858 65.858***
(0.000) (43.715) (1.184)
Number of Residents 4,995.940 7,384.417 2,388.477***
(3,720.693) (3,659.056) (109.045)
Urban Population (%) 84.795 71.820 -12.975***
(34.229) (42.213) (1.217)
Urban Area (%) 59.998 46.190 -13.807***
(38.167) (39.994) (1.179)
Green Party Votes (%) 1.291 1.877 0.586***
(1.077) (2.443) (0.067)
Labour Party Votes (%) 54.458 40.450 -14.009***
(18.097) (17.633) (0.526)
Density (residents/hectare) 30.104 27.851 -2.254**
(46.167) (35.895) (1.124)
Mean Age 38.684 40.274 1.590***
(5.115) (4.613) (0.140)
Semi-/Detached Housing (%) 49.609 55.292 5.683***
(27.254) (24.963) (0.754)
Home Ownership (%) 57.477 64.611 7.134***
(21.712) (17.166) (0.535)
No Educational Qualifications (%) 27.062 21.222 -5.840***
(10.759) (7.377) (0.239)
Unemployed (%) 5.545 3.944 -1.601***
(2.867) (1.869) (0.062)
High Trust Score (%) 70.651 72.014 1.363***
(4.910) (4.671) (0.140)
Willing to Switch to Green Appliance (%) 84.574 86.492 1.919***
(3.886) (3.607) (0.109)
Willing to Reduce Energy Use (%) 72.834 74.792 1.957***
(6.556) (6.038) (0.182)
Favor Green Energy (%) 73.857 73.398 -0.459***
(2.253) (2.573) (0.075)
Feel Responsible for Climate (%) 78.507 79.507 1.000***
(3.213) (3.256) (0.097)
Favor Green Subsidies (%) 66.378 69.316 2.938***
(5.876) (5.647) (0.169)
Favor Fossil Fuel Tax (%) 34.261 38.455 4.194***
(7.143) (8.288) (0.241)
Supplier Renewable Share (<10%) 8.126 7.622 -0.504***
(2.748) (2.303) (0.071)
Supplier Renewable Share (10%-25%)) 50.919 52.331 1.412***
(9.822) (7.350) (0.233)
Supplier Renewable Share (25%-40%)) 4.678 2.674 -2.004***
(3.969) (2.292) (0.079)
Supplier Renewable Share (40%-80%)) 25.379 23.357 -2.022***
(7.512) (5.682) (0.179)
Supplier Renewable Share (80%-99%)) 0.081 0.097 0.016**
(0.330) (0.194) (0.007)
Supplier Renewable Share (100%)) 8.158 10.753 2.594***
(3.746) (3.263) (0.100)
Supplier Renewable Share (Unknown) 2.660 3.167 0.507***
(1.273) (1.177) (0.035)
SMETS1 Meter Installed (%)S 32.604 35.084 2.480***
(16.376) (19.899) (0.575)
SMETS2 Meter Installed (%)S 0.161 0.239 0.079***
(0.289) (0.332) (0.010)
NSS Meter Installed (%) 6.684 6.940 0.256
(6.349) (5.470) (0.167)
Prepay Meter Installed (%) 17.050 17.308 0.258
(11.996) (10.059) (0.309)
Other Meter Installed (%) 43.501 40.429 -3.072***
(19.947) (21.372) (0.628)
Observations 1,364 6,671 8,035
Notes: The table shows the di↵erences in our balancing covariates across post-
code sectors that were eligible for selection in the randomization process versus
those that were not. All postcode sectors with at least one Utility customer were
eligible for selection in the randomization process.
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Table A.7: Di↵erences between Unselected and Selected
Postcode Sectors
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Unselected Selected Di↵erence
Customers 6.498 6.219 -0.279
(8.765) (7.953) (0.205)
Customers Per 1K Residents 1.072 1.045 -0.027
(1.886) (1.264) (0.039)
Urban Customers (%) 65.916 65.800 -0.116
(43.586) (43.851) (1.071)
Number of Residents 7,430.813 7,337.589 -93.224
(3,675.700) (3,642.134) (89.600)
Urban Population (%) 71.849 71.791 -0.058
(42.215) (42.218) (1.034)
Urban Area (%) 46.445 45.933 -0.511
(40.081) (39.911) (0.979)
Green Party Votes (%) 1.869 1.886 0.017
(2.301) (2.579) (0.060)
Labour Party Votes (%) 40.429 40.470 0.040
(17.578) (17.691) (0.432)
Density (residents/hectare) 27.866 27.836 -0.030
(35.682) (36.114) (0.879)
Mean Age 40.276 40.272 -0.004
(4.636) (4.590) (0.113)
Semi-/Detached Housing (%) 55.217 55.368 0.152
(24.901) (25.030) (0.611)
Home Ownership (%) 64.781 64.440 -0.341
(16.991) (17.341) (0.420)
No Educational Qualifications (%) 21.139 21.306 0.167
(7.254) (7.499) (0.181)
Unemployed (%) 3.923 3.965 0.043
(1.838) (1.900) (0.046)
High Trust Score (%) 72.038 71.990 -0.048
(4.660) (4.684) (0.114)
Willing to Switch to Green Appliance (%) 86.500 86.485 -0.015
(3.621) (3.594) (0.088)
Willing to Reduce Energy Use (%) 74.817 74.766 -0.051
(6.070) (6.007) (0.148)
Favor Green Energy (%) 73.395 73.401 0.006
(2.594) (2.553) (0.063)
Feel Responsible for Climate (%) 79.503 79.512 0.009
(3.251) (3.261) (0.080)
Favor Green Subsidies (%) 69.309 69.324 0.015
(5.670) (5.625) (0.138)
Favor Fossil Fuel Tax (%) 38.455 38.454 -0.001
(8.272) (8.305) (0.203)
Supplier Renewable Share (<10%) 7.621 7.623 0.002
(2.282) (2.325) (0.056)
Supplier Renewable Share (10%-25%)) 52.387 52.275 -0.112
(7.306) (7.395) (0.180)
Supplier Renewable Share (25%-40%)) 2.627 2.721 0.094*
(2.233) (2.350) (0.056)
Supplier Renewable Share (40%-80%)) 23.348 23.366 0.018
(5.695) (5.668) (0.139)
Supplier Renewable Share (80%-99%)) 0.095 0.099 0.004
(0.137) (0.238) (0.005)
Supplier Renewable Share (100%)) 10.753 10.753 0.000
(3.271) (3.256) (0.080)
Supplier Renewable Share (Unknown) 3.170 3.164 -0.006
(1.161) (1.193) (0.029)
SMETS1 Meter Installed (%)S 34.761 35.411 0.650
(19.876) (19.920) (0.487)
SMETS2 Meter Installed (%)S 0.244 0.235 -0.009
(0.344) (0.320) (0.008)
NSS Meter Installed (%) 6.874 7.006 0.132
(5.396) (5.543) (0.134)
Prepay Meter Installed (%) 17.180 17.437 0.257
(10.153) (9.964) (0.246)
Other Meter Installed (%) 40.942 39.911 -1.030**
(21.250) (21.486) (0.523)
Observations 3,351 3,320 8,035
Notes: The table shows the di↵erences in our balancing covariates across el-
igible postcode sectors that were selected for participation in the research—
whether as control or treated postcode sectors—and those that were not. All
postcode sectors with at least one Utility customer were eligible for selection
in the randomization process.
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Table A.8: Description of Covariates Used in Balance Tests
Customers Number of customers per postcode (Utility)
Customers Per 1K Residents Customers per 1,000 residents (Utility, ONS)
Urban Customers (%) Share of customers living in urban areas (ONS)
Number of Residents Resident population (ONS)
Urban Population (%) Share of urban population (ONS)
Urban Area (%) Share of the area of the postcode sector that is classified as urban (ONS)
Green Party Votes (%) Share of Green voters during the last General Elections (HoC)
Labour Party Votes (%) Share of Labour voters during the last General Elections (HoC)
Density (residents/hectare) Density (residents per hectare) (ONS)
Mean Age Average resident age (ONS)
Semi-/Detached Housing (%) Share of residents living in semi or detached housing (ONS)
Home Ownership (%) Share of residents who own their house (ONS)
No Educational Qualifications (%) Share of residents without educational qualifications (ONS)
Unemployed (%) Share of unemployed population (ONS)
High Trust Score (%) Share responding with a score of 5 or higher to the question: ”Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted, or that you cant be too careful in dealing with people?” (scale 0-10) (ESS)
Willing to Switch to Green Appliance (%) Share responding with a score of 5 or higher to the question: ”If you were to buy a large electrical appliance for your home,
how likely is it that you would buy one of the most energy e cient ones?” (scale 0-10) (ESS)
Willing to Reduce Energy Use (%) Share responding ”often, very often or always” to the question: ” In your daily life, how often do you do things to reduce
your energy use?” (ESS)
Favor Green Energy (%) Share responding ”Very large amount or large amount” to the question: ”How much electricity in this country should be
generated from renewable energies” (ESS)
Feel Responsible for Climate (%) Share responding with a score of 5 or higher to the question: ”To what extent do you feel a personal responsibility to try
to reduce climate change?” (scale 0-10) (ESS)
Favor Green Subsidies (%) Share responding in favor of using public money to subsidize renewable energy such as wind and solar power (ESS)
Favor Fossil Fuel Tax (%) Share responding in favor of increasing taxes on fossil fuels, such as oil, gas and coal (ESS)
Supplier Renewable Share (<10%) Share of energy accounts linked to energy providers with less than 10% renewable energy in their fuel mix (Elec)
Supplier Renewable Share (10%-25%) Share of energy accounts linked to energy providers with between 10% and 25% renewable energy in their fuel mix (Elec)
Supplier Renewable Share (25%-40%) Share of energy accounts linked to energy providers with between 25% and 40% renewable energy in their fuel mix (Elec)
Supplier Renewable Share (40%-80%) Share of energy accounts linked to energy providers with between 40% and 80% renewable energy in their fuel mix (Elec)
Supplier Renewable Share (80%-99%) Share of energy accounts linked to energy providers with between 80% and 99% renewable energy in their fuel mix (Elec)
Supplier Renewable Share (100%) Share of energy accounts linked to energy providers with 100% renewable energy in their fuel mix (Elec)
Supplier Renewable Share (Unknown) Share of energy accounts linked to energy providers whose fuel mix is unknown (Elec)
SMETS1 Meter Installed (%) Share of households with a SMETS1 meter installed (SMETS1 meters are the first generation of smart meter deployed by
the industry, which are not compatible with the UK’s centralized Data and Communication Company (DCC) but can send
30 min data to suppliers; they may revert to dumb mode if the customer switches supplier.) (Elec)
SMETS2 Meter Installed (%) Share of households with a SMETS2 meter installed (SMETS2 meters are the second generation of smart meter, which
provides data via the DCC and allows for supplier switching; about 120k - 130k of these installed as of Jan 2019, and
customers generally do not choose which type of meter gets installed when they sign up for a smart meter installation.)
(Elec)
NSS Meter Installed (%) Share of households with NSS meter installed (NSS meters are non-SMETS meters that have some smart capabilities) (Elec)
Prepay Meter Installed (%) Share of households with prepay meters (Elec)
Other Meter Installed (%) Share of households with other meters (i.e. standard dumb meters) (Elec)
Notes: Data come from the partner Utility, UK O ce of National Statistics (ONS), House of Commons Library (HoC), the European Social Survey (ESS), and Electralink
(Elec). This data is then overlaid with the postcode polygons from the Crown Copyright Ordnance Survey (GIS Code Point Dataset).
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D Treatment E↵ect Heterogeneity
Figures A.1 to A.10 estimate heterogeneous treatment e↵ects according to standard
socioeconomic characteristics to test whether we observe significant heterogeneity in
participants’ responses to our treatments. As discussed in our study pre-registry, we are
particularly interested in understanding whether the treatment e↵ects vary depending
not only on postcode sector-level sociodemographic characteristics such as age, edu-
cation, income, and race, but also depending on social, political, and environmental
variables. Recall in particular that evidence from the literature suggests signaling may
be particularly strong in greener locales (e.g., see Sexton and Sexton, 2014).
To analyze heterogeneity, we plot marginal treatment e↵ects according to various
values that characterize a given postcode sector, including (in this order) mean age,
percent lacking educational qualifications, mean annual net income, percent non-white,
percent non-Christian, percent Green Party voters, percent Labour Party voters, per-
cent owning two or more personal cars, percent of households on renewable energy
tari↵s, and percent reporting a trust score of 5 or greater in response to the ESS trust
question (”Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”, scaled 0-10). If particular individu-
als are more prone to motivational crowding in or out, such e↵ects—if of comparable
magnitude—could counter each other and imply a similar treatment e↵ect for Display
and Incentivized Display, as in our case. However, Figures A.1 to A.10 show that no
particularly strong heterogeneity is present in our sample (where Treatment 1 refers to
Display and Treatment 2 refers to Incentivized Display).
Figure A.1: Heterogeneous treatment e↵ects by mean age in the postcode sector
27
Figure A.2: Heterogeneous treatment e↵ects by possession of educational qualifications in
the postcode sector
Figure A.3: Heterogeneous treatment e↵ects by mean net annual income in the postcode
sector
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Figure A.4: Heterogeneous treatment e↵ects by percent non-white in the postcode sector
Figure A.5: Heterogeneous treatment e↵ects by percent non-Christian in the postcode
sector
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Figure A.6: Heterogeneous treatment e↵ects by percent Green Party voters in the postcode
sector
Figure A.7: Heterogeneous treatment e↵ects by percent Labour Party voters in the
postcode sector
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Figure A.8: Heterogeneous treatment e↵ects by car ownership in the postcode sector
Figure A.9: Heterogeneous treatment e↵ects by percent of households on 100% renewable
energy tari↵s in the postcode sector
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Figure A.10: Heterogeneous treatment e↵ects by percent of individuals with a trust score
of 5 or higher (on scale from 0-10)
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E Additional analysis
As shown in Table A.9, we do not find a statistically significant di↵erence in displaying
behavior based on whether the individual (i) received a financial incentive (regardless
of email received; column (1)), nor (ii) received the control email versus the email that
described the treatment to which they had been assigned. Additionally, in line with the
finding of no e↵ect of the financial incentive on participation, we find no di↵erence in
self-reported displaying behavior between the first (79%) and second (81%) treatment
arms ( 2-test, p=0.36)
Table A.9: E↵ect of Email and Treatment
Received on Displaying Material
(1) (2)









Notes: The dependent variable in this regression is a dummy variable
for having displayed the material (=1) or not (=0), and we report the
regression using standard OLS, though the results are virtually iden-
tical using a logit regression. The reference category for the regression
in column 1 is the group assigned to receive a material without any
financial incentive; the reference category in column 2 is the group as-
signed to receive a material without a financial incentive (as per Dis-
play treatment), and who also received an invitation email that invited
them to take part in a survey only (i.e. the same email received by the
Control group). Given the factorial design, the interpretation of coef-
ficients in column 2 mirrors that of a regression of material display be-
havior on the interaction between having received an email describing
the assigned treatment with having been assigned to receive a finan-
cial incentive, where the interaction coe cient is -0.21 (shown here as
the di↵erence between receiving an invitation only mentioning the ma-
terials and an email mentioning both the materials and the financial
incentive, controlling for assignment to receive a financial incentive).
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F Emails sent to participants
Consent email
Figure A.11 depicts the consent email that was sent to the Control group and to half of
the Display and Incentivized Display participants. The email text for all other emails
sent throughout the initiative follow.




textitI am getting in touch to invite you to be part of an initiative that’s exploring
how to encourage more people to support renewable power. It’s being held in
partnership with researchers at the Grantham Research Institute at the London
School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). By signing up using the link below,
you will receive a free garden sign or window sticker to display at home showing that
your household is powered by 100 per cent renewable electricity. This will contain
a promotional code that will give a £50 discount to any neighbors in ¡customer’s
postcode sector¿ who sign up with Utility because of your sign / sticker.
As part of the initiative, you will also have the opportunity to take part in a short
survey run by LSE, where 10 respondents will win £100.*
This is a real opportunity to help us understand how to engage more people with
the transition to clean energy. If you would like to take part, please click here to sign up.
Thank you,
Utility CEO Email Signature
*Survey winnings will come in the form of a versatile digital Tango gift card redeemable
for an e-gift card of your choice to one of a long list of popular UK retailers includ-





I am getting in touch to invite you to be part of an initiative that’s exploring how to
encourage more people to support renewable power. It’s being held in partnership with
researchers at the Grantham Research Institute at the London School of Economics
and Political Science (LSE).
By signing up using the link below, you will receive a free garden sign / window sticker
to display at home showing that your household is powered by 100 per cent renewable
electricity. This will contain a promotional code that will give a £50 discount to any
neighbours in ¡customer’s postcode sector¿ who sign up with Utility because of your
sign / sticker. And, for each neighbour who uses your promotional code, you will also
receive £50 o↵ of your next electricity bill.
Finally, as part of the initiative, you will have the opportunity to take part in a short
survey run by LSE, where 10 respondents will win £100.* This is a real opportunity
to help us understand how to engage more people with the transition to clean energy.
If you would like to take part, please click here to sign up.
Thank you,
Utility CEO Email Signature
*Survey winnings will come in the form of a versatile digital Tango gift card redeemable
for an e-gift card of your choice to one of a long list of popular UK retailers includ-






This is a reminder that you’ve been invited to take part in an initiative to promote
clean energy, being held in partnership with the Grantham Research Institute at the
London School of Economics (LSE).
By signing up, you will be able to take a short survey run by LSE, where 10 respondents
will win £100.*
This is a real opportunity to help us understand how to inspire more people to support
clean energy. Registration is open for one more week. So if you would like to take
part, please click here to sign up.
Thank you,
Utility CEO Email Signature”
*Survey winnings will come in the form of a versatile digital Tango gift card redeemable
for an e-gift card of your choice to one of a long list of popular UK retailers includ-





This is a reminder that you’ve been invited to take part in an initiative to promote
clean energy, being held in partnership with the Grantham Research Institute at the
London School of Economics (LSE).
By signing up using the link below, you will receive a free garden sign / window sticker
to display at home – showing that your household is powered by 100% renewable
electricity. This will contain a promotional code that will give a £50 discount to any
neighbours in <customer’s postcode sector> who sign up with Utility because of your
sign / sticker.
Finally, you will also be able to take a short survey run by LSE, where 10 respondents
will win £100.*
This is a real opportunity to help us understand how to inspire more people to support
clean energy. Registration is open for one more week. So if you would like to take
part, please click here to sign up.
Thank you,
Utility CEO Email Signature
*Survey winnings will come in the form of a versatile digital Tango gift card redeemable
for an e-gift card of your choice to one of a long list of popular UK retailers includ-





This is a reminder that you’ve been invited to take part in an initiative to promote
clean energy, being held in partnership with the Grantham Research Institute at the
London School of Economics (LSE).
By signing up using the link below, you will receive a free garden sign / window sticker
to display at home – showing that your household is powered by 100% renewable
electricity. This will contain a promotional code that will give a £50 discount to any
neighbors in <customer’s postcode sector> who sign up with Utility because of your
sign / sticker. And, for each neighbour who uses your promotional code, you will also
receive £50 o↵ of your next electricity bill.
Finally, you will also be able to take a short survey run by LSE, where 10 respondents
will win £100.*
This is a real opportunity to help us understand how to inspire more people to support
clean energy. Registration is open for one more week. So if you would like to take
part, please click here to sign up.
Thank you,
Utility CEO Email Signature
*Survey winnings will come in the form of a versatile digital Tango gift card redeemable
for an e-gift card of your choice to one of a long list of popular UK retailers includ-





Further to the series of email invites we sent you in March, this is a final reminder to
see if you would like to take part in an initiative to promote renewable energy ,
run in partnership with the Grantham Research Institute at the London School of
Economics (LSE).
This is a real opportunity to help us understand how to inspire more people to support
clean energy, so if you would like to take part, please click here to sign up before the
survey closes this Sunday (7 April) at 10pm.
Thank you,





Thank you for signing up to our initiative to explore how more people can be
encouraged to support renewable power in the UK. This has been set up as a joint
partnership between Utility and the Grantham Research Institute of the London School
of Economics (LSE).
More information will be emailed out to everyone participating in the initiative in
the coming 3-6 months. Don’t worry - if you leave Utility during this period, we will
withdraw your consent to be part of the initiative and you won’t receive any more
communications about it.
If you have any questions about the initiative in the meantime, please visit our
regularly updated FAQs. If you can’t find an answer to your question here, feel free to
get in touch with the project team at projectemail@lse.ac.uk
Finally, thank you for continuing to support Utility. It’s people like you who are
helping us achieve our vision of building a cleaner, greener future.




Thank you for signing up to our initiative to explore how more people can be
encouraged to support renewable power in the UK. This has been set up as a joint
partnership between Utility and the Grantham Research Institute of the London School
of Economics (LSE).
You will soon be receiving your garden sign in the post. We’d be grateful if
you could display it somewhere within your property where it will be most visible to
passers-by.
Please be aware that your sign will include a unique promotional code that provides
members of your community with a discount o↵ their first bill if they join Utility using
that code. We’ll let you know by email every time this happens.
We’ve made sure the sign is designed to be waterproof and weather resistant. It’s also
made of entirely recyclable materials, so please dispose of it responsibly.
Your sign will be ordered on 16 April and should reach you within a month. If you
haven’t received your sign by 31 May, please get in touch with the research team at
projectemail@lse.ac.uk.
How to find out more about the initiative
If you have any questions about the initiative in the meantime, please visit our
regularly updated FAQs. If you can’t find an answer to your question here, feel free to
get in touch with the project team at projectemail@lse.ac.uk.
Finally, thank you for continuing to support Utility. It’s people like you who are
helping us achieve our vision of building a cleaner, greener future.




Thank you for signing up to our initiative to explore how more people can be encouraged
to support renewable power in the UK. This initiative has been set up as a joint
partnership between Utility and the Grantham Research Institute of the London School
of Economics (LSE).
You will soon be receiving your window sticker in the post. We’d be grateful
if you could display it somewhere within your property where it will be most visible to
passers-by.
Please be aware that your sticker will include a unique promotional code that provides
members of your community with a discount o↵ their first bill if they join Utility using
that code. We’ll let you know by email every time this happens.
We’ve made sure the sticker is designed to be waterproof and weather resistant. And
that, when you want to remove it, it can be easily and cleanly peeled o↵.
Your sticker will be ordered on 16 April and should reach you within a month. If you
haven’t received your sticker by 31 May, please get in touch with the research team at
projectemail@lse.ac.uk.
How to find out more about the initiative
If you have any questions about the initiative in the meantime, please visit our
regularly updated FAQs. If you can’t find an answer to your question here, feel free to
get in touch with the project team at projectemail@lse.ac.uk.
Finally, thank you for continuing to support Utility. It’s people like you who are
helping us achieve our vision of building a cleaner, greener future.
Utility CEO Email Signature
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Incentized Display (Yard Sign)
Dear NAME,
Thank you for signing up to our initiative to explore how more people can be
encouraged to support renewable power in the UK. This has been set up as a joint
partnership between Utility and the Grantham Research Institute of the London School
of Economics (LSE).
You will soon be receiving your garden sign in the post. We’d be grateful if
you could display it somewhere within your property where it will be most visible to
passers-by.
Please be aware that your sign will include a unique promotional code that
provides you with a £50 discount o↵ your Utility bill every time someone within
your community joins Utility using that code, and they will receive a discount, too.
We’ll let you know by email every time this happens.
We’ve made sure the sign is designed to be waterproof and weather resistant. It’s also
made of entirely recyclable materials, so please dispose of it responsibly.
Your sign will be ordered on 16 April and should reach you within a month. If you
haven’t received your sign by 31 May, please get in touch with the research team at
projectemail@lse.ac.uk.
How to find out more about the initiative
If you have any questions about the initiative in the meantime, please visit our
regularly updated FAQs. If you can’t find an answer to your question here, feel free to
get in touch with the project team at projectemail@lse.ac.uk.
Finally, thank you for continuing to support Utility. It’s people like you who are
helping us achieve our vision of building a cleaner, greener future.
Utility CEO Email Signature
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Incentivized Display (Window Cling)
Dear NAME,
Thank you for signing up to our initiative to explore how more people can be
encouraged to support renewable power in the UK. This has been set up as a joint
partnership between Utility and the Grantham Research Institute of the London School
of Economics (LSE).
You will soon be receiving your window sticker in the post. We’d be grateful
if you could display it somewhere within your property where it will be most visible to
passers-by.
Please be aware that your sticker will include a unique promotional code that
provides you with a £50 discount o↵ your Utility bill every time someone within
your community joins Utility using that code, and they will receive a discount, too.
We’ll let you know by email every time this happens.
We’ve made sure the sticker is designed to be waterproof and weather resistant. And
that, when you want to remove it, it can be easily and cleanly peeled o↵.
Your sticker will be ordered on 16 April and should reach you within a month. If you
haven’t received your sticker by 31 May, please get in touch with the research team at
projectemail@lse.ac.uk.
How to find out more about the initiative
If you have any questions about the initiative in the meantime, please visit our
regularly updated FAQs. If you can’t find an answer to your question here, feel free to
get in touch with the project team at projectemail@lse.ac.uk.
Finally, thank you for continuing to support Utility. It’s people like you who are
helping us achieve our vision of building a cleaner, greener future.
Utility CEO Email Signature
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Notification of materials distribution emails
Dear Valued Customer,
Thank you once again for taking part in our joint research initiative to engage more
people within your community and lead them to switch to renewable power.
We apologise the programme has taken longer to activate than anticipated, and we’re
very pleased to say that we’re now posting out your pack this week which will contain
clear instructions on how to get started.
In the meantime, please visit the project FAQ page if you have further questions.
Many thanks,
Utility Team and the Research Team at the LSE
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Letters accompanying the materials
Yard Sign
Thank you once again for taking part in our joint research initiative, to see if we
can engage more people within your community and lead them to switch to renewable
power. Your garden sign is enclosed.
Included with this letter is the sign (and stake) that we would like to ask you to display
at home so that we can reach the goals of this research.
The referral code is now active, so you can put it up as soon as is convenient. The
code will be valid until 30 April 2020, although you can of course remove the sign
beforehand. To ensure the validity of the study, we would be grateful if you could keep
the sign up for at least four months. To maximise the chance of success, it would be
great if you could choose a spot that’s most visible to passers-by or visitors, such as a
front garden or a street facing window.
The sign is waterproof and weather resistant, so you should be able to keep it on
display for as long as you’d like. If you want to remove it, the sign is made of entirely
recyclable material to allow you to dispose of it responsibly.
Here are some simple instructions for posting your sign:
Step 1: Remove the double sided tape from the ground stake.
Step 2: Apply to the reverse of sign and push into the ground.
We’ll send you an email in a few weeks to check if everything’s gone well with
displaying the sign.
Finally, thank you for continuing to support Utility. It’s people like you who are
helping us build a cleaner, greener future.
Utility Team and the Research Team at the LSE
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Window Cling
Thank you once again for taking part in our joint research initiative, to see if we
can engage more people within your community and lead them to switch to renewable
power. Your window sticker is enclosed.
Included with this letter is the window sticker that we would like to ask you to display
at home so that we can reach the goals of this research.
The referral code is now active, so you can put the sticker up as soon as is convenient.
The code will be valid until 30 April 2020, although you can of course remove the
sticker beforehand. To ensure the validity of the study, we would be grateful if you
could keep the sticker up for at least four months. To maximise the chance of success,
it would be great if you could place it in a spot that’s most visible to passers-by or
visitors, such as a street facing window.
The sticker needs to be applied from the inside and has been designed to be easily and
cleanly removed. Here are some simple instructions for applying your sticker:
Step 1: Make sure the surface area where you want to apply the sticker is clean.
Step 2: Peel the protective paper from the label.
Step 3: Apply the sticker to the surface starting at the top and smoothing
downwards, releasing the air bubbles.
We’ll send you an email in a few weeks to check if everything’s gone well with
displaying the sticker.
Finally, thank you for continuing to support Utility. It’s people like you who are
helping us build a cleaner, greener future.




Thank you again for signing up to our initiative to explore how to encourage others to
support renewable power in the UK.
By now you should have received your display material in the post, and we’d like to
make sure that the process of receiving and displaying your new material has been
smooth for you. We’d appreciate if you could click on one of the following options to
let us know:
• I have received the package and have displayed the material
• I have received the package but I have not yet displayed the material
• I have not yet received the package
Some customers have emailed us with pictures of their materials on display –
we’ve loved it! If you have any pictures you’d like to share, please send them to
projectemail@lse.ac.uk.
If you have any further questions about the initiative, please visit our FAQs. If you
can’t find an answer to your question here, feel free to get in touch with the research
team at the email address shown above.
Once again, thank you for continuing to support Utility. It’s people like you who are
helping us achieve our vision of building a cleaner, greener future.
Utility Team and the Research Team at the LSE
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G Debrief Survey Questionnaire
Control Questionnaire
Thank you for taking the time to complete this brief survey. We’d like
to begin by learning a little bit about your neighborhood.
Roughly how many years have you lived in your current neighbourhood?
•




Not at all strongly
How often do you chat to your neighbours, more than to just say hello?
On most days
Once or twice a week
Once or twice a month
Less than once a month
Never
Don’t have any neighbours
Thinking about the people who live in this neighbourhood, to what extent do you
believe they can be trusted?
Many of the people can be trusted
Some of the people can be trusted
A few of the people can be trusted
None of the people can be trusted
Just moved here
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
need to be very careful in dealing with people?
Most people can be trusted
Need to be very careful
Finally, we’d like to learn a bit more about you.















Not including yourself, please indicate the NUMBER of household members





How often do you...






N/A (can’t do this)






N/A (can’t do this)






N/A (can’t do this)
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Do you consider yourself an environmentalist?
– Yes
– No




Higher education (University, college or equivalent)
What is your employment status?
Employed
Self-employed




Unable to work (e.g. disability)
Other
Which phrase best describes the area where you live?
Big city
Suburbs or outskirts of a big city
Town or a small city
Country village
Farm or home in the countryside
Which of the following groups represents your total household pre-tax income
(i.e. your personal income, or both you and your partners combined income if
cohabiting)?
Please include income from earnings, self-employment, benefits, pensions, and
interest from savings. (Note that all survey responses are anonymous and confi-
dential.)
Below 10,000 per year (below 199 per week)
10,000 - 16,000 per year (241 - 308 per week)
16,000 - 19,999 per year (309 - 389 per week)
20,000 - 24,999 per year (390 - 489 per week)
25,000 - 34,999 per year (490 - 679 per week)
35,000 - 44,999 per year (680 - 869 per week)
45,000 - 59,999 per year (870 - 1,149 per week)
60,000 - 79,999 per year (1,150 - 1,549 per week)
52
Over 80,000 per year (over 1,550 per week)
I’d prefer not to say.











Thank you for taking our survey - we really appreciate your time!
If you have any additional questions or comments, please feel free to leave them
below.
Treatment Questionnaire
Thank you for taking the time to complete this brief survey.




If the answer to the question “As part of the initiative, did you receive a sign or
window cling?” was “Yes (sign)” or “Yes (window cling)”:
Did you display your sign/window cling?
– Yes
– No Depending on the answer to the previous question, “sign” or “window
cling” was displayed. The same applies to the next question.
Could you please kindly indicate why you have not displayed your sign/window
cling by checking the relevant box(es) below?
I do not have a place within my property to display my materials that is
visible to passersby.
I previously displayed my material but it has been damaged by weather or
pests.
I do not like the way the material looks.
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I did not realise that I had signed up to receive materials (please elaborate
below):
Other
If the answer to the first question was “No”:
We are sorry to hear you haven’t received your material. So that we may under-
stand why this happened and how to better serve our participants in the future,
please kindly check the box(es) below that apply:
I have moved home since signing up to the study.
I do not have a designated place within my property to receive packages.
Other
If the answer to the question “Did you display your sign/window cling?” was
“Yes (sign)”:






Somewhere else (please explain, including floor number where applicable):
If the answer to the question “Did you display your sign/window cling?” was
“Yes (window cling)”:




Somewhere else (please explain, including floor number where applicable):
If the answer to the question “Where did you display your sign?” was “Balcony”
or “Street-facing window” or the response to the question “Where did you display
your window cling?” was “Street-facing window” or “Courtyard”:








If the answer to the question “Where did you display your window cling?” was
”Mailbox”:
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Is your mailbox visible to the public or only to other residents of your building?
Public
Residents in my building only
Other




If the answer to the question “Did you display your sign/window cling in a location
that was easily visible to passersby?” was “Yes”:
Considering the location of your dwelling and of your displayed sign/window cling,
what is your best guess of the number of passersby to whom your sign/window
cling would have been visible in a given week? If the response to the question
“Did you display your sign/window cling in a location that was easily visible to
passersby?” was “Yes”:
To the best of your memory, on which date did you put your sign/window cling
on display? (Note that it was put in the post in early June 2019.)
If the answer to the question “Did you display your sign/window cling in a location
that was easily visible to passersby?” was “Yes”:
Is your sign/window cling still on display?
Yes
No
If the answer to the question “Is your sign/window cling still on display?” was
“Yes”:
Is it still in good condition?
Yes
No (please describe briefly)
If the answer to the question “Is your sign/window cling still on display?” was
“No”:
When did you take down your sign/window cling?
If the answer to the question “Is your sign/window cling still on display?” was
“No”:
Could you please let us know why the sign/window cling is no longer on display?




– Simply decided I no longer wanted it on display
– Other
If the answer to the question “Did you display your sign/window cling in a location
that was easily visible to passersby?” was “Yes”:
What did you primarily hope to achieve by displaying the sign/window cling?
Displaying may encourage others to adopt renewable energy as well, which
would have environmental benefits.
I love Good Energy, and this is the least I can do to support them the same
way they’ve supported me.
I want others to know that my dwelling is powered by 100% renewable energy.
I was interested in the financial incentives associated with the initiative.
For all options that were not selected:
Did any of these other motivations factor into your decision to display?
– Displaying may encourage others to adopt renewable energy as well, which
would have environmental benefits.
I love Good Energy, and this is the least I can do to support them the same
way they’ve supported me.
I want others to know that my dwelling is powered by 100% renewable energy.
I was interested in the financial incentives associated with the initiative.
Other (please explain):
Have you or anyone else in your household sent the discount code to friends,
family, or colleagues via text, email, photo, etc.?
– Yes (please state how many below)
– No
We would now like to learn a little bit about your neighborhood.
Roughly how many years have you lived in your current neighbourhood?
–




Not at all strongly
How often do you chat to your neighbours, more than to just say hello?
On most days
Once or twice a week
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Once or twice a month
Less than once a month
Never
Don’t have any neighbours
Thinking about the people who live in this neighbourhood, to what extent do you
believe they can be trusted?
Many of the people can be trusted
Some of the people can be trusted
A few of the people can be trusted
None of the people can be trusted
Just moved here
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
need to be very careful in dealing with people?
Most people can be trusted
Need to be very careful
Finally, we’d like to learn a bit more about you.














Not including yourself, please indicate the NUMBER of household members





How often do you...







N/A (can’t do this)






N/A (can’t do this)






N/A (can’t do this)
Do you consider yourself an environmentalist?
⇤ Yes
⇤ No




Higher education (University, college or equivalent)
What is your employment status?
Employed
Self-employed




Unable to work (e.g. disability)
Other
Which phrase best describes the area where you live?
Big city
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Suburbs or outskirts of a big city
Town or a small city
Country village
Farm or home in the countryside
Which of the following groups represents your total household pre-tax income
(i.e. your personal income, or both you and your partners combined income
if cohabiting)?
Please include income from earnings, self-employment, benefits, pensions,
and interest from savings. (Note that all survey responses are anonymous
and confidential.)
Below 10,000 per year (below 199 per week)
10,000 - 16,000 per year (241 - 308 per week)
16,000 - 19,999 per year (309 - 389 per week)
20,000 - 24,999 per year (390 - 489 per week)
25,000 - 34,999 per year (490 - 679 per week)
35,000 - 44,999 per year (680 - 869 per week)
45,000 - 59,999 per year (870 - 1,149 per week)
60,000 - 79,999 per year (1,150 - 1,549 per week)
Over 80,000 per year (over 1,550 per week)
I’d prefer not to say.











Thank you for taking our survey - we really appreciate your time!
If you have any additional questions or comments, please feel free to leave
them below.
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